The United States could insist on a price markup as well. North had been searching for funding to assist the Contras without directly violating the Boland Amendment, with limited success. Now, he thought he saw a way to accomplish multiple goals simultaneously. If funds from the Iranian arms sales could be diverted to assist the Contras, the administration would be well positioned to free the hostages in the Middle East and combat Marxism in Latin America.
Admiral Poindexter, as the new national security adviser, might have halted the arrangement. Bud McFarlane was out of office, and a new man could have modified the plan, possibly convincing Reagan to find a safer, less risky alternative. Instead of reining in North, however, Poindexter provided his assistant with increased discretionary authority in the arms-for-hostages deal.
Imbued with more power and responsibility than most lieutenant colonels possess, North charged forward, directing the scheme with virtually no oversight. Reagan had established general priorities, but the president did not know about the operational specifics. The lack of knowledge about the details gave Reagan plausible deniability if the operation failed. For their part, the Iranians initially scoffed at the suggested price markup for the armaments, but they could not hold out indefinitely.
The Iranian army sorely needed the weapons. Unfortunately, no hostages were released as a direct result of the sale. Their objective was to facilitate increased arms sales. The men were humiliated to discover that they would not meet with high-ranking Iranians. Instead, they were shepherded into sessions with mid-level bureaucrats. Otherwise, you can work with my staff. From beginning to end, the trip was a debacle.
In addition to keeping the Americans waiting, the Iranians increased their demands, insisting that the Israelis abandon the Golan Heights and arguing that spare parts for Hawk missiles must be shipped before any additional hostages were released.
Disgusted, the group departed after four days. McFarlane advised President Reagan to discontinue his outreach to the duplicitous Iranians. Although Reagan understood that the Iranians did not always act in good faith, his administration had invested much time and energy in the project. He directed his men to continue their efforts. As the scheme changed, the American team expressed frustration with Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian arms broker.
Aside from the difficulty they experienced negotiating with the Iranians, administration officials came to see Ghorbanifar as a dishonest intermediary. North was pleased with the change. He invited Bahramani to Washington, D. This greater number of participants meant that the Americans were negotiating with hardliners as well as moderates within the Iranian government.
Moreover, with the increased number of participants, the possibility of public disclosure increased. The scheme encountered difficulties when it came to funding the Contras as well. The airdrops commenced in April and continued until the Nicaraguan army shot down a transport plane on October 5, Everyone on board died except for a loading specialist, Eugene Hasenfus, an American civilian captured by the Nicaraguans. At a press conference held shortly after his capture, Hasenfus revealed that he had flown supplies to several CIA hotspots around the world, including Nicaragua.
His statements greatly embarrassed the Reagan administration. Worse was yet to come. On November 3, , a pro-Syrian Lebanese magazine, Ash-Shiraa , reported on the arms-for-hostages plan, including details about timing and shipments. Although the article did not reveal the source of the information, the Americans believed that the disgruntled Ghorbanifar probably leaked the material. Mehdi Hashemi, a high-ranking member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was another possible source.
The Reagan administration initially denied the stories of an arms-for-hostages plan, but with the Hasenfus press conference and the Ash-Shiraa story coming so close together, it was impossible to conceal American involvement. In the meantime, angry members of Congress demanded answers.
Faced with few good options, President Reagan spoke to the American people on the subject. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages.
As for a linkage between the arms sales and hostage negotiations, Reagan empathically denied the existence of a causal relationship. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon.
And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. That no concessions policy remains in force, in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments.
We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we. Whether Reagan knew on November 13 that his statements were not the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth remains a point of contention.
In any case, he did not mention a linkage between hostages in Lebanon, Iranian arms sales, and funding for the Nicaraguan Contras. The linkage would become public soon enough. It did not. Six days later, Reagan held a press conference to address the issue again.
He conceded on one point. I have further directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided to the appropriate Members of Congress.
A third party was involved, and it was soon clear that Israel was that party. Members of Congress, reporters, and the public reacted with outrage. With a potential scandal in the making, Attorney General Edwin Meese, a long-time Reagan confidant, conducted an internal investigation.
It was an informal inquiry, and Meese did not provide a written report. North told the attorney general that he had written the memo, but he asked that it remain secret.
Meese later claimed that he, Meese, told President Reagan about the memo on November 24, It was clear that the scandal would grow, and the entire scheme would become public knowledge. North later explained that he was trying to protect the lives of individuals involved in the plot who might be killed because of their assistance to the Americans. North also said that he personally witnessed National Security Adviser Poindexter destroy the signed version of a presidential action directive authorizing the CIA to ship a Hawk missile to Iran.
Admiral Poindexter had resigned, he said, and a White House review board was investigating the matter. After Reagan hastily departed, Attorney General Meese revealed the connection between Iranian arms sales and funding for the Contras.
The public reaction was immediate, and devastating. The Reagan administration had violated the policy against dealing with terrorists in Iran, and it had circumvented the Boland Amendment by secretly funding the anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua.
The lead story characterized the Reagan administration as lawless, and the NSC and CIA as rogue, out-of-control elements within a rudderless administration. Following the Church Committee hearings in the s, when the CIA was found to have engaged in extralegal activities in numerous countries, Congress had instituted changes to ensure that the executive branch, especially the CIA, would not overreach in the future.
It appeared that the institutional controls had failed. The administration needed scapegoats, and it needed them immediately. Admiral Poindexter resigned as national security adviser, and Reagan fired Lt. Oliver North. That same day—November 25—Reagan announced the creation of a special review board to investigate the affair.
The Tower Commission, as it was called, convened on December 1, , and published its report relatively quickly, on February 26, These tasks have been properly left to others. During its brief tenure, the Tower Commission heard testimony from 86 witnesses and examined numerous NSC documents. Although he probably did not know about the diversion of funds for the Contras, Reagan should have known. He was too disengaged from the scheme to oversee his underlings effectively, the report concluded.
The authors singled out Oliver North, Admiral Poindexter, and Defense Secretary Weinberger for withering criticism of their roles in the scandal. Often heralded as the Teflon President—because negative stories did not stick to him—and a great communicator, Reagan was accustomed to receiving mostly positive press coverage. The criticism stung him deeply. He introduced the Tower Commission report at a press conference but refused to answer questions.
The report had criticized his chief of staff, Donald T. Regan, for allowing chaos to overtake the White House decision-making process. To demonstrate his willingness to correct deficiencies in his administration, Reagan fired Regan and replaced him with a well-respected former United States senator from Tennessee, Howard Baker. Baker promised to reform the White House and hold administration officials accountable for their actions.
It was a classic example of a reform that was too little, too late. In any event, Baker commissioned another internal investigation to determine whether the president had any criminal exposure. To his immense relief, the results suggested that Reagan could not be implicated in criminal wrongdoing.
Facing calls for additional external investigations, Baker became the voice of moderation, promising to cooperate with all inquiries.
Reagan understood that the Tower Commission investigation would not satisfy public concern. Bowing to political pressure, he agreed to the appointment of an independent counsel. On December 19, , a two-judge panel appointed a retired federal judge, Lawrence Walsh, to determine whether anyone involved in Iran-Contra should be prosecuted. That same month, the House of Representatives and the Senate select committees on intelligence conducted closed-door hearings.
The independent counsel was concerned that the congressional committees would interfere in his investigation and thereby jeopardize the possibility of securing criminal indictments.
In the end, the committee allowed for 12 weeks of testimony from 32 witnesses. Several witnesses received limited grants of immunity. Some testimony was offered on television, and some was delivered behind closed doors. McFarlane was charged with four counts of withholding information from Congress, a misdemeanor. North was charged with 12 counts relating to conspiracy and making false statements. Although he was convicted in his initial trial, the case was dismissed on appeal, due to a technicality, and North has since worked as a conservative author, critic, television host and head of the NRA.
Poindexter was initially indicted on seven felonies and ultimately tried on five. He was found guilty on four of the charges and sentenced to two years in prison, although his convictions were later vacated.
In addition, four CIA officers and five government contractors were also prosecuted; although all were found guilty of charges ranging from conspiracy to perjury to fraud, only one—private contractor Thomas Clines—ultimately served time in prison.
Despite the fact that Reagan had promised voters he would never negotiate with terrorists—which he or his underlings did while brokering the weapons sales with Iran—the two-term occupant of the White House left office as a popular president. However, his legacy, at least among his supporters, remains intact—and the Iran-Contra Affair has been relegated to an often-overlooked chapter in U. The Iran-Contra Affair— The Washington Post.
The Iran-Contra Affairs. Brown University. The Iran-Contra Affair. Iran Hostage Crisis. The Iran-contra scandal 25 years later. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! Subscribe for fascinating stories connecting the past to the present. Fueled by territorial, religious and political disputes between the two nations, the conflict ended in an effective stalemate and a cease-fire nearly eight years The United States and Iran have never formally been at war, but tensions between the two countries have persisted for decades.
Below is an overview of the long-running conflict between Iran and the United States—and measures taken economic and otherwise in the wake of flare On November 4, , a group of Iranian students stormed the U. By the time the sales were discovered, more than 1, missiles had been shipped to Iran.
Three hostages had been released, only to be replaced with three more, in what Secretary of State George Shultz called "a hostage bazaar. He retracted the statement a week later, insisting that the sale of weapons had not been an arms-for-hostages deal.
Despite the fact that Reagan defended the actions by virtue of their good intentions, his honesty was doubted. Polls showed that only 14 percent of Americans believed the president when he said he had not traded arms for hostages.
Then-unknown Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council explained the discrepancy: he had been diverting funds from the arms sales to the Contras, with the full knowledge of National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and with the unspoken blessing, he assumed, of President Reagan.
Poindexter resigned, and North was fired, but Iran-Contra was far from over. The press hounded the president: Did he know about these illegal activities, and if not, how could something of this magnitude occur without his knowledge?
In an investigation by the Reagan-appointed Tower Commission, it was determined that, as president, Reagan's disengagement from the management of his White House had created conditions which made possible the diversion of funds to the Contras.
But there was no evidence linking Reagan to the diversion. Speculation about the involvement of Reagan, Vice President George Bush and the administration at large ran rampant.
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh investigated the affair for the next eight years. Fourteen people were charged with either operational or "cover-up" crimes. In the end, North's conviction was overturned on a technicality, and President Bush issued six pardons, including one to McFarlane, who had already been convicted, and one to Weinberger before he stood trial.
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